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Abstract 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are currently being adopted in a number of 
jurisdictions, including the European Union. Despite the importance of IFRS in the context of 
global accounting standards harmonization, little is known regarding what institutional factors 
influence countries’ decisions to voluntarily adopt IFRS. This issue is relevant to standard setters 
because a better understanding of the motivations for adoption will enable them to promote IFRS 
more effectively to countries that currently do not employ IFRS. Consistent with bonding theory, 
we find that countries with weaker investor protection mechanisms are more likely to adopt 
IFRS. Our evidence also shows that jurisdictions that are perceived to provide better access to 
their domestic capital markets are more likely to adopt IFRS. Taken together, our results are 
consistent with the view that IFRS represent a vehicle through which countries can improve 
investor protection and make their capital markets more accessible to foreign investors.  
  
1. Introduction  
The positive impacts of global accounting harmonization have been increasingly 
recognized by countries around the world. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
are currently being adopted in a number of jurisdictions. In 2005, IFRS will be required in at 
least 65 countries for all domestic listed companies, including 28 European Union and European 
Economic Area member countries. In the U.S., more than 400 European SEC registrants that 
currently use their national GAAP will switch to IFRS by the end of 2005.   
In 2002, the (then) U.S. SEC chairman Harvey Pitt delivered a speech on the 
convergence of capital markets: 1  “If, by 2005, there has been sufficient progress in the 
improvement and short-term convergence of accounting standards, in the development of a 
process and structure for consistent interpretation and application of IFRS, and in the 
enhancement of financial reporting infrastructure, then I believe that 2005 could become the 
target date on which it may be appropriate for the SEC to determine whether foreign private 
issuers from EU member countries should be required to reconcile from IFRS to U.S. GAAP.” In 
fact, the SEC released an agreement on April 22, 2005, which envisions that by 2009, and 
perhaps as early as 2007, European companies that follow IFRS might be able to file financial 
reports with the SEC without reconciling to U.S. GAAP (New York Times, April 23, 2005). 
Despite the importance of IFRS adoption in the context of global accounting 
harmonization, little is known about the institutional characteristics of jurisdictions that choose 
to adopt these standards. With a better understanding of the legal and economic factors that 
determine the demand for IFRS, standard setters might be able to promote IFRS more effectively 
to countries that currently do not employ IFRS.  
                                                 
1 Source: Revsine, Collins and Johnson, 3rd edition, 2005, page 1018 and Financial Times October 8, 2002. 
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Our sample includes 38 countries around the world, some of which have voluntarily 
adopted IFRS at the end of 2004. We examine a group of institutional factors that might 
influence a country’s decision to adopt IFRS: securities laws on security offerings, anti-director 
rights, law enforcement, and commitment to building a more accessible capital market to foreign 
investors. Countries with relatively weak investor protection mechanisms in place might be more 
likely to adopt IFRS if they seek to improve their investor protection by “bonding” to a reporting 
standard that provides more comparable and comprehensive financial information. As Ross 
(1979) points out, issuers can signal the quality of their equity to investors by resorting to 
additional mechanisms when verification is costly. Countries with relatively weak investor 
protection mechanisms have incentives to voluntarily adopt stringent international standards in 
order to reduce the expropriation risk by majority shareholders.  In contrast, countries that 
already have effective investor protection mechanisms in place might view potential benefits 
from adopting IFRS as only marginal, and therefore are less likely to adopt IFRS. Our empirical 
analysis supports this prediction.       
We further hypothesize that the law enforcement level of a country is negatively related 
to the adoption of IFRS. The bonding theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, the demand for a high 
quality accounting standard such as IFRS will be lower in a country with more effective law 
enforcement. Using Public_enforcement and Orders indexes to represent across-country private 
and public enforcement of laws, we find that law enforcement level is negatively associated with 
a country’s decision to adopt IFRS, consistent with the notion that the benefit from bonding is 
higher for firms in countries with poor law enforcement.   
We also predict a positive association between the access to capital markets and the 
adoption of IFRS. By opening up its capital market, a country can better appeal to a foreign 
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capital base by providing more opportunities and liquidity for investors who seek portfolio 
diversification, therefore lowering firms’ cost of capital. In contrast, a relatively closed capital 
market provides few opportunities and low return on investment for foreign investors. A country 
already committed to opening up its capital markets is more likely to use IFRS to increase access 
and attract additional investors, thus we would observe a positive association between the access 
to capital markets and the likelihood of IFRS adoption. Our evidence is consistent with this view. 
Our study is one of the earliest attempts to identify country-level determinants of 
accounting standard choice.  Although prior studies have examined voluntary adoption of 
IAS/IFRS at the firm-level (e.g., Ashbaugh, 2001), there is little evidence on institutional 
features for jurisdictions that adopt IFRS early. Our study also serves as a complement to the 
study of firm-level determinants of IFRS adoption given that the decision to adopt IFRS can be 
made either at the firm-level (if IFRS are one of the reporting standards firms are allowed to 
choose from) or at the country-level (if IFRS are mandated to be followed as nation-wide 
reporting standards).   
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background 
knowledge, describe our motivation, and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3, we discuss our 
research design. We discuss the sample and report the empirical results in Section 4. Finally, we 
conclude in Section 5.   
 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
In this section, we provide background information on IFRS, describe the bonding theory 
and cost/benefit framework, and develop our hypotheses related to investor protection and 
capital market access. 
 
 3  
2.1 Background on International Accounting Standards 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) are a set of standards stating how particular 
types of transactions and other events should be reflected in financial statements, issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). From April 1, 2001, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) superseded IASC’s role of international accounting 
standard setting and began issuing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
The trend of accounting globalization has been accelerated by voluntary compliance with 
IFRS and has been strengthened by several major events in the past five years. The International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) endorsed the IASC standards for cross-border 
stock exchange listings in 2000. In 2001 the IASC was restructured as the IASB, thereby gaining 
support of the SEC (IASC, 2000). Many major stock exchanges around the world, including the 
London, Frankfurt, Zurich, Luxembourg, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Amsterdam, Rome, and Kuala 
Lumpur stock exchanges, accept financial statements of foreign listed companies prepared under 
IFRS without reconciliation. In 1998, the law §292a HGB was passed in Germany, which 
permits German listed companies to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with either 
IFRS or U.S. GAAP. The European Commission (EC) and Australian regulators have announced 
that IFRS will be adopted from 2005 (IASB, 2002). All European listed companies (more than 
7,000) are required to adopt IFRS for consolidated financial statements starting from January 1, 
2005. In addition, IFRS will be permitted or required for companies in at least 30 other countries. 
One possible reason why Europe has decided to adopt IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP for 
international harmonization of accounting standards is because IFRS are viewed as more 
politically neutral (Zeff, 1998).  
 4  
On April 22, 2005, the SEC released a “roadmap” toward allowing European companies 
that follow IFRS to sell securities in the U.S. without having to revise their financial statements 
(New York Times, April 23, 2005). 2  The roadmap establishes a goal of eliminating the 
requirement of reconciling the financial reports prepared under IFRS in accord with U.S. GAAP 
as early as possible between now and 2009 at the latest. Street, Nichols, and Gray (2002) provide 
empirical support for this “roadmap” by showing that in recent years the impact of accounting 
differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP is narrowing. Leuz (2003) finds that IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP firms from the New Market exchange do not exhibit significant differences in several 
information asymmetry proxies. He concludes that U.S. GAAP and IFRS produce financial 
statements of similar informational quality and that IFRS and U.S. GAAP may be viewed as 
comparable in reducing information asymmetries. Nicolaisen (2005) does not expect that IFRS 
and U.S. GAAP will necessarily produce totally identical financial statements, however, he 
considers it necessary that convergence result in close alignment of accounting for the same or 
essentially the same transactions, comparable results in trends, a continued cooperative will to 
reduce differences over time, and a transparent understanding of any significant differences. 
 
                                                 
2 According to the New York Times article, SEC Chairman William Donaldson supports the convergence program 
being undertaken jointly by the IASB and the U.S. FASB. Achieving that goal would, among other things, depend 
on a detailed analysis of the faithfulness and consistency of the application and interpretation of IFRS in financial 
statements across companies and jurisdictions, and continued progress on the IASB-FASB convergence project. 
Chairman Donaldson cautioned that “the ultimate success of IFRS will depend on many parties – including 
companies, auditors, standard-setters and regulators, but I am glad that all parties are taking on the challenge. We 
need the contributions of all of them to reach the goal.” Source: New York Times (April 23, 2005) and 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-62.htm. 
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2.2 Bonding Theory and Investor Protection Hypotheses  
Coffee’s (2002) bonding theory states that cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange 
commits the listing firm to respect minority investor rights and to provide more comprehensive 
disclosure. We employ Coffee’s (2002) bonding theory to explain why firms choose IFRS and 
why countries voluntarily adopt IFRS. By adopting IFRS, issuers expose their accounting 
information to international scrutiny of reputational intermediaries such as brokerage analysts, 
auditors, and credit rating agencies (Coffee, 2002). Coffee (2002) terms this channel reputational 
bonding. Tarca (2004) uses signaling theory (Spence, 1973) to explain why firms approach 
international capital markets by adopting international standards. The adoption of international 
standards could signal to market participants that the firm is committed to disclosing more 
information to investors, to listing on foreign stock exchanges, or to absorbing international 
capital infusion. Reputational bonding is costly to controlling shareholders because it restricts 
their ability to expropriate rents from the firm (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). Bonding to IFRS 
also empowers international minority shareholders to utilize shareholders’ rights against 
management decisions. This channel is called legal bonding or liability bonding. Ding et al. 
(2005) provide evidence that IFRS require more comprehensive disclosures than do most 
countries’ accounting standards. Information asymmetry and agency problems are likely to 
diminish after the adoption of IFRS because insiders face a higher risk of class-action lawsuit by 
minority shareholders. As IFRS encourage international investment, domestic firms will be 
accountable to minority shareholders from different countries.  
Reese and Weisbach (2002) find that increased investor protection decreases managers’ 
ability to expropriate wealth from the firm and subsequently increases the firm’s stock price. 
Shareholders’ protected rights typically include mandates for disclosures and accounting 
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information, the receipt of pro-rata dividends, voting for directors, participation in shareholders’ 
meetings, subscription to new issues of securities on the same terms as the insiders, the ability to 
sue directors or the majority for suspected expropriation, and the opportunity to call 
extraordinary shareholders’ meetings, etc. (La Porta et al., 2000).3  
We use four variables to represent the following four aspects of investor protection: (1) 
securities laws on new equity offerings; (2) anti-director rights held by minority shareholders; (3) 
public law enforcement; and (4) private law enforcement. The strictness of securities laws and 
the magnitude of anti-director rights indicate the maturity and completeness of the investor 
protection mechanism developed by a country’s law makers.  The degree of public and private 
law enforcement measures the effectiveness and efficiency of enforcement of the investor 
protection mechanism. The legal development of investor protection mechanism and the law 
enforcement represent two independent but positively correlated processes.  
Our first variable is the Disclosurerq index, which measures the strength and strictness of 
mandatory disclosure requirements by securities laws pertaining to the “promoter’s problem.” La 
Porta et al. (2005) calculate the Disclosurerq index as the average score of the following six 
areas: (1) prospectus4; (2) insiders’ compensation; (3) ownership by large shareholders; (4) 
inside ownership; (5) contracts outside the normal course of business; and (6) transactions with 
related parties. Increased disclosure requirements are a means to reduce information asymmetries 
and mitigate the agency problems existing between shareholders and management (Jensen and 
                                                 
3 Better legal protection of outside shareholders is associated with: (1) higher valuation of corporate assets (La Porta 
et al., 2002); (2) higher valuation of listed firms relative to their assets (Claessens, et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002); 
(3) lower private benefits of control (Zingales, 1994; Nenova, 1999); (4) higher correlation between investment 
opportunities and actual investments (Wurgler, 2000); (5) financial market expansion (La Porta et al., 2002); and (6) 
lower cost of equity (Giannetti and Koskinen, 2004). 
4 The most basic area is whether promoters can issue securities without delivering a prospectus describing them to 
potential investors in advance. Since every country requires a prospectus before securities are sold and listed, the 
operational word here is “delivering.” In some countries, it is possible to sell securities after a prospectus is 
deposited at the company, or with the Supervisor, without delivering it to investors. Delivering a prospectus to 
potential investors is an affirmative step in making disclosures to them (La Porta et al., 2005). 
 7  
Meckling, 1976). Investors in countries with weak disclosure requirements (or weak securities 
laws) demand more information when firms issue equities. In order to require issuers to disclose 
more information, governments have to modify or create securities laws regarding securities 
offerings. However, it is a time-consuming and costly process for most countries to stipulate a 
comprehensive set of securities laws or accounting standards. Hence, bonding to IFRS offers a 
better solution to such information demand because IFRS requires a higher level of disclosures in 
financial reporting relative to most domestic accounting standards (e.g., Ding et al., 2005). In 
turn, countries with weak disclosure requirements by securities laws may have a greater tendency 
to adopt IFRS. Our hypothesis 1a is then:5 
 
H1a: A country’s decision to adopt IFRS is negatively correlated with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of securities laws in that country. 
 
The second variable for investor protection is the anti-director rights of minority 
shareholders in that country, Antidir. 6  This anti-director rights index measures the legal 
protection afforded to minority shareholders against the private benefits of control of managers 
and controlling shareholders in the corporate decision making process. High anti-director rights 
are associated with effective corporate governance, as reflected in valuable and broad financial 
                                                 
5 All hypotheses are stated in the alternative. 
6 The anti-director index reflects such aspects of minority rights as (1) the ease of voting for directors; (2) the 
freedom of trading shares during a shareholders meeting; (3) the possibility of electing directors through a 
cumulative voting mechanism or proportional representation of minorities on the board; (4) the existence of a 
grievance mechanism for oppressed minority shareholders (i.e., class-action lawsuit); (5) the existence of a 
preemptive right to new security issues by the firm; and (6) the percentage of votes needed to call an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting. For each of the first five measures, a country gets a score of 1 if it protects minority 
shareholders according to this measure and a score of 0 otherwise. For the sixth measure, a country gets a score of 1 
if the percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting is at or below the world 
median of 10 percent, and a score of 0 otherwise. Finally, these six anti-director rights scores are added up into an 
aggregate score as the anti-director index. (Source: La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2002) 
 8  
markets, dispersed ownership of shares, and efficient allocation of capital across firms (La Porta 
et al., 2000). La Porta et al. (2002) further find that anti-director rights are positively associated 
with the valuation of corporate assets, suggesting that the level of legal protection of investors in 
a country is an important determinant in the development of its financial markets. By limiting 
expropriation of controlling shareholders, the investor protection mechanism raises the securities 
prices in the marketplace, leading to the expansion of financial markets.  
We hypothesize that countries with low (high) anti-director rights are more (less) likely 
to adopt IFRS for two reasons. First, countries with low anti-director rights may view the 
adoption of IFRS (a bonding behavior) as a way to improve investor protection. They are willing 
to “bond” themselves to a reporting standard that provides information with enhanced 
comparability and comprehensiveness. 7  Second, because family-controlled firms are more 
common in poor investor protection countries (La Porta et al., 1999), the concentration of family 
ownership and control discourages minority shareholders’ activism against controlling 
shareholders. Considering the cost and length of legal process and the potential deterrent from 
family-controlled firms, countries with low anti-director rights may adopt IFRS as a way to 
improve minority shareholders rights rather than modify or create anti-director laws/regulations. 
Our hypothesis 1b is then: 
 
H1b: A country’s decision to adopt IFRS is negatively correlated with the level of anti-
director rights in that country. 
 
                                                 
7 As a competing hypothesis it is possible that countries with high anti-director rights may be reluctant to adopt 
IFRS since they already have relatively effective investor protection mechanisms in place and thus view only trivial 
incremental benefit of IFRS adoption. 
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In this study, we measure the overall quality of investor protection using the level of 
disclosure requirements and the enforcement of security regulations. The quality of financial 
information is a function of both the quality of accounting standards and regulatory enforcement 
(Kothari, 2000) and prior studies show that the enforcement of accounting standards is as 
important as the quality of accounting standards (e.g., Hope, 2003; Sunder, 1997). We posit that 
the enforcement of investor protection mechanism is highly positively correlated with the 
enforcement of laws in a country because both securities laws and accounting regulations (i.e., 
GAAP) are monitored and enforced by government regulators. We use anti-director rights, as 
well as the effectiveness of public enforcement (the Public_enforcement index) and the 
effectiveness of private enforcement (the Orders index), to represent the effectiveness of 
enforcement of investor protection mechanism.8 
La Porta et al. (1997) indicate that the extent of law enforcement in a country is 
influenced by the economy and laws in that country. They show that richer countries enforce 
laws better than poorer countries, and French Civil law countries have the lowest quality of law 
enforcement after controlling for per capita income. Regulatory enforcement is a separate 
mechanism from accounting standards and is essential to the corporate application of accounting 
standards. Ceteris paribus, the quality of law enforcement directly impacts the quality of 
financial reporting of domestic firms. We hypothesize that countries with weak (strong) public 
enforcement are more (less) likely to adopt IFRS. Countries with weak public enforcement may 
realize that the quality of financial reporting of their domestic firms is comparatively low and 
                                                 
8 La Porta et al. (2005) study five aspects of public law enforcement: (1) “Supervisor attributes,” measures public 
enforcer’s independence including the processes of its key members’ appointment, dismissal, and working focus; (2) 
“Rule-making power” measures whether the public enforcer has the power to regulate primary offerings and/or 
listing rules on stock exchanges; (3)  “Investigative powers” measures the investigative powers of the public 
enforcer; (4)  “Orders” covers non-criminal sanctions for violations of securities laws; (5) “Criminal sanctions” is 
the average scores for criminal sanctions against directors, distributors, and accountants. The average of the 
preceding five sub-indexes forms the index of public enforcement. 
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that improving the level of public enforcement is a time-consuming and costly process. Thus 
they are more likely to adopt IFRS because the adoption of IFRS is viewed as an immediate way 
to improve the quality of financial reporting. Those countries with weak public enforcement are 
willing to “bond” themselves to a reporting standard that provides information with enhanced 
comparability and comprehensiveness (the bonding theory), offsetting some of the disadvantages 
of weak public enforcement.9 Our Hypothesis 1c is as follows. 
 
H1c: A country’s decision to adopt IFRS is negatively correlated with the level of public 
enforcement in that country. 
 
Among the five sub-indexes of public enforcement (see Table 1), we are especially 
interested in the “orders” because it most directly substitutes for the strength of private 
enforcement. Orders cover non-criminal sanctions for violations of securities laws. These 
sanctions include ordering the directors (issuers, distributors or accountants) of a public firm to 
rectify non-compliance with disclosure requirements, to institute changes recommended by 
outside reviewers, and to compensate investors for their losses. (La Porta et al., 2005). Countries 
with weak private enforcement are willing to “bond” themselves to a high reporting standard to 
improve investor protection. In contrast, countries with strong private enforcement may be 
reluctant to adopt IFRS since they already have relatively effective private enforcement 
mechanisms in place and high quality of financial reporting, and thus view only trivial 
incremental benefit of IFRS adoption. Thus, we hypothesize that firms with weak (strong) 
                                                 
9 Countries with strong public enforcement may be reluctant to adopt IFRS since they already have relatively 
effective law enforcement mechanisms in place and high quality of financial reporting, and thus view only trivial 
incremental benefit of IFRS adoption. 
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“orders” in their home country are more (less) likely to adopt IFRS. Our Hypothesis 1d (which is 
clearly not independent of H1c) is as follows. 
 
H1d: A country’s decision to adopt IFRS is negatively correlated with the level of 
“orders” in that country. 
 
2.3 Cost/Benefit Framework and Capital Markets Access Hypothesis  
The potential benefits of bonding to IFRS include lower cost of capital and higher firm 
value, increased shareholder base and trading volume, and better reputation (e.g., Leuz, 2003; 
Hope, Kang and Zang, 2005). Besides the firms that benefit from the lower cost of capital, 
financial statement users including domestic minority shareholders, foreign investors, as well as 
governments are apparent beneficiaries of higher accounting quality.10 The potential costs of 
IFRS adoption include both transitional costs of IFRS adoption and on-going costs of 
compliance (to the firms) and enforcement (to the relevant government agencies) (e.g., 
Carnachan, 2003). Hence our cost and benefit analyses in this section include but are not limited 
to the benefits and costs of the bonding behavior. 
Carnachan (2003) notes that the first benefit of convergence to IFRS is lower transactions 
costs for preparers of financial reports, since they would be able to comply with a single set of 
accounting standards instead of multiple sets. Second, a positive “network externality” arises 
because the widespread usage of one set of standards saves users of financial information the 
time and energy of having to learn to apply and interpret multiple sets of standards. Third, 
                                                 
10 Barth, Landsman and Lang, (2005) find that IFRS adopting firms have higher financial reporting quality after 
adoption than before. 
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convergence to IFRS will enhance comparability between entities’ financial statements for 
investors, thus potentially making investment decisions easier.  
Carnachan (2003) points out that convergence to IFRS generates both one-time 
transitional costs and the on-going costs of maintaining a standard-setting system for global 
accounting principles. In the short-term, successful convergence involves protracted negotiations 
among the IASB, as well as the various national standard-setters and regulators, government 
officials and interested professionals with a vested interest in participating in the convergence 
process. This requires the expenditure of a significant amount of time and money. Direct 
compliance costs also arise as a result of the need to retrain preparers, users, auditors and 
regulators to apply and interpret the converged global standards. Once existing standards have 
been converged, there will be on-going costs as mechanisms need to be put in place to permit the 
formulation of future standards.11 
Do the capital markets of a country (aggregated firms) benefit from adopting IFRS? This 
is probably the most important reason for a government to voluntarily initiate the IFRS 
compliance in that country. El-Gazzar, Finn, and Jacob (1999) state that firms voluntarily 
comply with IFRS because they wish to obtain exposure to new markets, obtain foreign debt and 
equity capital, improve customer recognition, or reduce political costs. Tarca (2004) finds that 
competitive market forces can promote the use of international standards since many firms 
believe the use of international standards will enable better communication with information 
users. KPMG (2000) reports in a survey that the reasons for European companies to switch from 
national standards to international standards include (1) the possibility of increasing the 
availability of capital and lowering its cost; (2) the perceived high quality of IFRS; and (3) 
                                                 
11 In addition, it is possible that widespread use of IFRS would impose a cost on issuers by depriving them of the 
ability to choose to operate in jurisdictions where the accounting rules best reflect the nature of their business. 
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preferences of institutional investors and analysts. Providing empirical support for the survey 
results, Leuz and Verrecchia (2001) examine German firms that changed from national to 
international standards and find that cost of capital (proxied by bid-ask spread and trading 
volume) is reduced. Barth, Landsman and Lang (2005) find that firms that adopt IFRS show less 
evidence of earnings smoothing, less evidence of managing earnings towards a target, more 
timely recognition of losses, and a higher association with returns. Their results suggest that 
IFRS adoption improves financial reporting quality. If all the firms in a country adopt IFRS 
simultaneously and their financial reportings have enhanced quality (i.e., accounting information 
is more reliable, relevant, and accurate), the capital markets of the country as a whole gain better 
reputation and thus attract more foreign investments.  
Making the country’s capital market more accessible to foreign investors has distinct 
benefits. By opening up its capital market, a country can attract foreign capital by providing 
investors with opportunities for portfolio diversification. Liberalizing restrictions and reducing 
barriers to cross-border capital flows can improve the functioning of emerging stock markets by: 
(1) enhancing the integration of emerging markets into world capital markets; (2) forcing 
domestic firms to upgrade their information disclosure policies and accounting systems to seek 
foreign investment; (3) leading domestic firms to upgrade trading systems to support more 
trading and the introduction of a greater variety of financial instruments; and (4) accelerating 
economic growth by enhancing stock market liquidity (Levine et al., 1996). Opening up capital 
markets can increase efficiencies in the domestic financial system, which will enhance the 
competitiveness of the economy at large (Hanson, 1995). Countries with relatively immature or 
closed capital markets are less likely to converge to a higher accounting standard because those 
countries do not provide infrastructural framework for international investors to generate 
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reasonable returns. The net incremental benefit of such convergence for countries with immature 
capital markets is smaller than that for countries with opened capital markets.  
We predict that countries that provide high (poor) access to the domestic capital markets 
for foreign investors are more (less) likely to adopt IFRS. The domestic capital markets with 
high access for foreign investors should have a high percentage of foreign investor ownership 
and control. Foreign investors evaluate domestic firms by comparing domestic financial reports 
and ratios to those of foreign peers. Since the process of comparing financial reports prepared 
under different accounting standards not only consumes time and money but also bears the risk 
of errors, foreign investors prefer the use of a uniform set of accounting standards such as IFRS. 
In contrast, domestic capital markets with low access for foreign investors are primarily owned 
and controlled by domestic investors who own little foreign stocks. To the extent that the 
controlling shareholders of firms domiciled in relatively closed capital markets enjoy large 
private control benefits (e.g., voting rights, cash flow rights, etc.), their incentives to support 
government decisions to make the capital markets more accessible to foreign investors might be 
low. Therefore, jurisdictions that are already committed to making their capital markets more 
accessible for international investors are more likely to voluntarily adopt a uniform international 
accounting standard. Hypothesis 2 is then: 
 
H2: A country’s decision to adopt IFRS is positively correlated with the access level of 
that country’s capital markets. 
 
3. Regression Model and Variables  
We use the following logit model to test our hypotheses.  
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 OrdersβorcementPublic_enfβAntidirβrqDisclosureβαIFRS 43212004 ++++=   
                  εLogGNPβMktcapβCIFARβAccessβ +++++ 8765    (1) 
where, 
IFRS2004: defined as 1 if the countries have adopted IFRS as of December 31, 2004, and 
0 otherwise.12  
Disclosurerq: an index of disclosure requirements that measures the strength of specific 
disclosure requirements pertaining to promoters and issuers. 
Antidir: an index of anti-director rights that measures how strongly the legal system 
favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate 
decision-making process, including the voting process.  
Public_enforcement: an index that represents the level of public enforcement in a country.  
Orders: an index that represents the level of private enforcement (i.e., sanctions against 
issuers, distributors, and accountants) in a country. 
Access: an index of the extent to which business executives in a country agree with the 
statement “Stock markets are open to new firms and medium-sized firms” that proxies for the 
easiness of access to domestic capital markets by international investors (Schwab et al., 1999).  
We control for three additional factors that potentially relate to the decision to adopt 
IFRS. First, we control for the transparency of accounting information and quality of financial 
reporting by using the CIFAR index.13 Different from the Disclosurerq index (a legal approach to 
                                                 
12 As a robustness test we also use 2005 as the adoption year (see Section 4.3). 
13 La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that a country’s financial accounting regime affects enforcement of investors’ rights 
in that country. They measure the quality of the accounting regime with an index developed for each country by the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The CIFAR index rates annual reports of at least 
three firms in a country on the basis of ninety disclosure items. The average of the summation of these points is the 
CIFAR index for that country (see Hope, 2003). 
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measure the strength of specific disclosure requirements pertaining to the issuers/promoters by 
securities laws), the CIFAR index is a financial-reporting approach to measure the across-country 
corporate disclosure intensity.14 Since only mandatory disclosures, one component of the CIFAR 
index, are subject to the scrutiny of government agencies, we expect a weak negative association 
between the adoption of IFRS by a country and the CIFAR index that represents the quality of 
financial reporting in that country. 
Second, we control for the development of securities markets using the proxy Mktcap, 
which is measured as the ratio of stock market capitalization held by small shareholders to gross 
domestic product for the period 1996-2000 (La Porta et al., 1999). Since the development of 
securities markets is highly correlated to the access to those markets (Pearson correlation = 
0.649), we predict a positive association between the adoption of IFRS and the development of 
securities markets. Third, we include the natural logarithm of GNP (obtained from the 1996 
World Development Report) to control for the size of the domestic markets with the expectation 
of a negative association because countries with smaller markets potentially have a greater 
incentive to access international investors (Reese and Weisbach, 2002).  
We test 10 different models for our hypotheses because some of the explanatory variables 
in our study are potentially correlated.15 Correlation between explanatory variables may impede 
                                                 
14 The Pearson correlation between CIFAR and Disclosurerq is relatively low (=0.415), suggesting that these two 
indexes are conceptually different. The major difference between the two is that the Disclosurerq index focuses on 
the mandatory disclosure requirement for promoters by securities laws whereas the CIFAR index focuses on the 
mandatory disclosures (required by domestic accounting standards) and voluntary disclosures of financial reports. 
Thus the Disclosurerq index reflects the strictness of securities laws in protecting minority shareholders while the 
CIFAR index reflects the general level of mandatory/voluntary disclosures. The CIFAR index equally weights every 
disclosure item and does not differentiate voluntary disclosure from mandatory disclosure. Equal weight for each 
disclosure item may bias the index because the information content and implication of each disclosure item varies. 
In addition, the CIFAR index may only partially reflect a country’s disclosure environment given the small sample 
of firms in each country to calculate the index. 
15 For instance, Public_enforcement is significantly positively correlated with Orders (Pearson correlation = 0.828), 
indicating that a country with higher public enforcement of laws likely has higher private enforcement of laws. 
Another example is the positive correlation between Access and Mktcap (Pearson correlation = 0.649), indicating 
that highly developed domestic stock markets provide high accessibility for foreign investors. 
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interpretation of regression results. For this reason we examine Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
of all reported regressions. All VIFs are lower than 4.3, indicating that multicollinearity is not a 
serious issue in the estimation.  
 
4. Data Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate results 
Table 1 defines the variables included in our study including the sources from which each 
variable is collected. Table 2 presents data on the IFRS adoption and independent variables for 
our sample of 38 countries. The table shows that 12 countries voluntarily adopted IFRS before 
the end of 2004. In 2005, nine more countries will converge to IFRS: seven EU member 
countries as well as Australia and Norway. 
Table 3 reports Pearson correlations in the lower half and Spearman correlations in the 
upper half for our variables and their two-sided significance levels. Pearson correlations are 
consistent in signs with Spearman correlations for the relation between the dependent variable 
IFRS2004 and the test variables (i.e., Disclosurerq, Antidir, Public_enforcement, Orders, and 
Access). The correlations between IFRS2004 and various explanatory variables are consistent 
with our hypotheses: (1) IFRS2004 is negatively correlated with Disclosurerq (Pearson 
correlation significant at the five percent level); (2) IFRS2004 is weakly negatively correlated 
with Antidir (Pearson correlation significant at the 12 percent level); (3) IFRS2004 is negatively 
correlated with both Public_enforcement and Orders (Pearson correlation significant at the five 
percent level); and (4) IFRS2004 is positively correlated with Access (Pearson correlation 
significant at the eight percent level). 
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4.2 Regression results 
Table 4, Models 1 to 10, presents the results of regressions of the adoption of IFRS by 
December 31, 2004 on the four investor protection proxies, i.e., disclosure requirement, anti-
director rights, public enforcement, orders, and stock market access. Our empirical evidence is 
consistent with our hypotheses.  After controlling for CIFAR, market capitalization and GNP, we 
find in Models 1 and 2 that countries with low disclosure requirements and weak anti-director 
rights are more likely to adopt IFRS (the estimated coefficients are negative and t-values are 
significant at the one percent and five percent level, respectively). Second, Models 3 and 4 show 
that the coefficients of Public_enforcement and Orders are also negative and significant (t-values 
are significant at the one percent level). Third, we find in Model 5 that countries with greater 
access of stock markets for foreign investors are more likely to adopt IFRS (the coefficient of 
Access is positive and t-value is significant at the one percent level). In summary, we find that 
the adoption of IFRS before the end of 2004 is significantly negatively associated with both the 
investor protection and law enforcement variables, which is consistent with our hypotheses H1a, 
H1b, H1c, and H1d. Moreover, IFRS adoption is significantly positively related to the 
accessibility of domestic stock markets, which is consistent with our hypothesis H2.  
Models 6 to 10 present multivariate regression results by testing jointly the impact of 
investor protection, law enforcement, and market access variables. We find that the coefficients 
on either Public_enforcement (Models 7 and 10) or Orders (Models 6 and 9) are negative and 
significant at the 10 percent level or better, suggesting that the adoption of IFRS by 2004 is 
negatively correlated with the extent of public and private enforcement of laws within the 
country. Based on the coefficient on Access (Models 6 to 10), we conclude that IFRS adoption is 
significantly positively associated with the stock market accessibility.  Among Models 8 to 10, 
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the coefficient on Antidir is significant only in Model 8 that excludes Public_enforcement or 
Orders.   
The regression results presented in Table 4 are consistent with our hypotheses. In sum, 
we have three important findings. First, based on the coefficients on Disclosurerq and Antidir 
variables, we conclude that the adoption of IFRS is negatively correlated with the investor 
protection level within a country. Second, based on the coefficients on Public_ enforcement and 
Orders variables, we conclude that the adoption of IFRS is negatively associated with the extent 
of public and private law enforcement. Third, based on the coefficient on the Access variable, we 
conclude that the adoption of IFRS is positively related to the stock market accessibility of a 
country.  
4.3. Robustness Tests 
We conduct several robustness tests. First, we replace the dependent variable IFRS2004 
by IFRS2005 and run the same ten regressions. The dichotomous variable IFRS2005 is defined 
as 1 if the countries will have adopted IFRS as of December 31, 2005, and 0 otherwise. Table 5 
presents the regression results of the adoption of IFRS by the end of 2005. The regression results 
are consistent with those of Table 4 and our three main findings remain robust.16  
As an additional (untabulated) robustness test, we add an indicator variable for common 
law legal system (as compared with code law) as a new control variable to all regressions. We 
find no significant association between legal origin and the adoption of IFRS. More importantly, 
our previously reported results continue to hold after controlling for legal origin. 
                                                 
16 First, based on the coefficients on Disclosurerq and Antidir variables, we confirm the hypotheses H1a and H1b 
and find that the adoption of IFRS is negatively correlated with the investor protection level within a country. 
Second, based on the coefficients on Public_ enforcement and Orders variables, we confirm the hypotheses H1c and 
H1d and find that the adoption of IFRS is negatively correlated with the extent of public and private law 
enforcement in a country. Third, based on the coefficient on Access variable, we confirm the hypothesis H2 and find 
that the adoption of IFRS is positively correlated with the stock market access of a country.   
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 5. Conclusions 
As international financial reporting standards (IFRS) have been developed and accepted 
internationally, the decision of a country to adopt IFRS becomes an important topic for 
researchers and standard setters. This decision can be influenced by various institutional factors. 
We use Coffee’s (2002) bonding theories and cost/benefit analysis to predict the association 
between adoption of IFRS and certain institutional factors. In particular, we examine the role of 
investor protection, law enforcement, and stock market access in the adoption decision.  
Using a sample of 38 countries, we document a significant negative association between 
the adoption of IFRS and investor protection or law enforcement. In particular, countries with 
weak shareholder protection (i.e., poor disclosure rules and weak law enforcement) are more 
likely to adopt IFRS than are countries with strong shareholder protection. The findings are 
consistent with the view that countries with weak shareholder protection bond themselves to 
superior accounting standards in order to access international investors and/or markets. Our 
empirical analyses further support the view that countries providing better access to their stock 
markets for international investors are more likely to adopt IFRS. The adoption of IFRS is likely 
viewed as a means to improve disclosure policies and accounting systems, to enhance the 
integration of domestic markets into world markets, and to subsequently accelerate economic 
growth. In order to improve financial reporting quality, the adoption of IFRS by a country is an 
important step.  
One important implication of our study is that countries that already have relatively 
strong investor protection mechanisms in place might view little incremental net benefit from 
IFRS adoption.  This suggests that standard setters should highlight the benefits of uniform 
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reporting standards across countries.  As Pownall and Schipper (1999) suggest, the components 
of high quality financial reporting include not only transparency and full disclosure but also 
comparability.  Thus, even if a country already has a reporting system that produces relatively 
transparent financial information, investors can benefit from cross-country comparability.  At a 
minimum, uniform reporting standards reduce the non-trivial costs of financial statement 
reconciliation currently associated with international (and in particular U.S.) equity listings (e.g., 
Biddle and Saudagaran, 1989; Hope, Kang and Zang, 2005), thus potentially facilitating 
economic growth.  
Although the adoption of IFRS is meant to achieve uniformity worldwide, it is possible 
that this desired uniformity may remain theoretical rather than real due to the lack of 
simultaneous changes of other accompanying institutions (e.g., Ding et al., 2005). Ball (2001) 
suggests that greater uniformity of accounting standards is unlikely to achieve greater 
comparability of financial statements so long as differences in the economic and political 
infrastructures determine financial reporting in actual practice. He also points out that higher-
quality standards do not automatically lead to higher-quality financial reporting. Future research 
needs to address two important questions: (1) whether the economic, financial and governance 
institutions at the country level change after the adoption of IFRS; and (2) whether the financial 
reporting quality of a country improves after the adoption of IFRS.     
 22  
References 
Ashbaugh, H. 2001. “Non-US firms’ accounting standard choices.” Journal of Accounting and  
Public Policy, Vol. 20, 129-153. 
Ball, Ray. 2001. “Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of public  
financial reporting and disclosure.” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 
127-169. 
Barth, M., W. Landsman, M. Lang. 2005. “International accounting standards and accounting  
quality.” Working paper, Stanford University and University of North Carolina. 
Biddle, G.C., and Saudagaran, S. M., 1989. “The effects of financial disclosure levels on firms’ 
choices among alternative foreign stock exchange listings.” Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting Vol. 1, 55-87. 
Carnachan, R. 2003. “The case for competition between US GAAP and IFRS in US capital  
Markets.” Working paper, Harvard Law School. 
Claessens, S., S. D. Djankov, J. H. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. 2002. “Disentangling the incentive  
and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, 2741-
2771. 
Coffee, J. C. 2002. “Racing towards the top?: The impact of cross-listings and stock market  
competition on international corporate governance.” Working paper, Columbia Law 
School. 
Ding, Y., O.-K. Hope, T. Jeanjean, H. Stolowy. 2005. “Differences between domestic accounting  
standards and IAS: Measurement, determinants and implications.” Working paper, HEC 
Paris and University of Toronto.  
El-Gazzar, S. M., P. M. Finn, and R. Jacob. 1999. “An empirical investigation of multinational  
firms’ compliance with International Accounting Standards.” The International Journal 
of Accounting, Vol. 34:2, 239-248. 
Giannetti, M., Y. Koskinen. 2004. “Investor protection and the demand for equity.” SSE/EFI  
Working paper series in Economics and Finance No. 526. 
Hanson, J.A. 1995. “Opening the capital account: Costs, benefits, and sequencing.” In Capital  
Controls, Exchange Rates, and Monetary Policy in the World Economy, ed. by S. 
Edwards, Cambridge University Press, New York, 383-430. 
Hope, O.-K. 2003. “Disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards, and analysts’  
forecast accuracy: An international study.” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41:2, 
235-272. 
Hope, O.-K., T. Kang, Y. Zang. 2005. “The bonding hypothesis revisited: Do cross-listing  
firm bond to the improved disclosure environment in the United States?” Working paper, 
University of Toronto and Singapore Management University. 
IASC. “News – IASC members approve new constitution.” (2000) http://www.iasc.or-
g.uk/news/cen8_096.htm. May 24. 
IASB. “IASB/IAS around the world/capital markets and IFRS/national regulators.” (2002)  
http://www.iasb.org.uk. July 7. 
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency  
costs and ownership structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, 305-360. 
Kothari, S. P. 2000. “The role of financial reporting in reducing financial risks in the market.” In  
E. S. Rosengren and J. S. Jordan ed.: Building an Infrastructure for Financial Stability, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series No.44, 89-102. 
 23  
KPMG. 2000. “Global financial reporting, IAS or US GAAP?” A European survey, London. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1997. “Legal determinants of  
 external finance.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 1131-1150. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1998. “Law and finance.” Journal  
of Political Economy, Vol. 106, 1113-1155. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. “Corporate ownership around the  
world.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 54:2, 471-517. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2000. “Investor protection and  
corporate governance.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, 3-27. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2002. “Investor protection and  
corporate valuation.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, 1147-1170. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2005. “What works in securities laws?”  
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. 
Leuz, C. 2003. “IAS Versus U.S. GAAP: Information asymmetry-based evidence from  
Germany’s new market.” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.41:3, 445-472. 
Leuz, C. and R. Verrecchia. 2001. “The economic consequences of increased disclosure.”  
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 20, 129-153. 
Levine, Ross & Zervos, Sara, 1996. “Stock market development and long-run growth.” World  
Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, Vol. 10:2, 323-339. 
Nenova T. 1999. “The value of a corporate vote and private benefits: a cross-country analysis.”  
Working paper, Harvard University. 
Nicolaisen, D. T. 2005. “A securities regulator looks at convergence.” Forthcoming, Journal of 
International Law and Business. 
Pownall, G., and K., Schipper. 1999. “Implications of accounting research for the SEC’s 
consideration of International Accounting Standards for U.S. security offerings.” 
Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13, 259-280.  
Reese, W. A., and M. S. Weisbach. 2002. “Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross 
listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 66, 65-104. 
Revsine, L., D.W. Collins and W.B. Johnson. 2005. Financial reporting and analysis. Third 
edition, Pearson Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Ross, S. 1979. “Disclosure regulation in financial markets: Implication of modern finance theory  
and signaling theory.” In Franklin Edwards ed.: Issues in Financial Regulation, McGraw-
Hill, New York. 
Schwab, K., M. Porter, and J. Sachs. 1999. The Global Competitiveness Report 1999. Geneva,  
World Economic Forum. 
Spence, M. 1973. “Job market signaling.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, 355- 
374. 
Street, D. L., N. B. Nichols, and S. J. Gray. 2000. “Assessing the acceptability of international  
accounting standards in the US: An empirical study of the materiality of US GAAP 
reconciliations by non-US companies complying with IASC standards.” The 
International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 35:1, 27-63. 
Sunder, S. 1997. Theory of Accounting and Control. Thompson Learning. 
Tarca, A. 2004. “International convergence of accounting practices: Choosing between IAS and  
US GAAP.” Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 15:1, 
60-91. 
 24  
White, H. 1980. “A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity.” Econometrica, Vol. 48:4, 817-838. 
Wurgler, J. 2000. “Financial markets and the allocation of capital.” Journal of Financial  
Economics, Vol.  58, 187-214. 
Zeff, S. A. 1998. “An American view on CLERP.” Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 8:2, 3-8. 
Zingales, L. 1994. “The value of the voting right: A study of the Milan stock exchange  
experience.” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 7, 125-148. 
 
 
 
 25  
Table 1 
Description of the Variables 
This table defines the variables collected for the 38 countries included in our study. We present the description and the sources from which each variable is collected. 
 
Variables  Description
  
IFRS2004 Defined as 1 if the countries have adopted IFRS as of December 31, 2004, and 0 otherwise. 
 
IFRS2005 Defined as 1 if the countries will have adopted IFRS by December 31, 2005, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Early/late Defined as 0 if the countries adopted IFRS during 2004 or early, 1 if the countries adopted IFRS during 2005, and 2 if the countries do not 
adopt IFRS before December 31, 2005.  
 
Disclosure requirement 
 
An index aggregating investor protection. We add one when we have any of the six proxies for the strength of specific disclosure requirements 
pertaining to the promoter’s: (1) prospectus; (2) insiders’ compensation; (3) ownership by large shareholders; (4) insider ownership; (5) 
contracts outside the normal course of business; and (6) transactions with related parties. The index is the average of the preceding six proxies. 
Source: La Porta et al. (2005). 
 
Anti-director rights 
 
An index aggregating shareholder rights. The index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, 
(2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the 
sample median), or (6) when shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. The range for the index is 
from zero to six. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Public enforcement The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics index; (2) Investigative powers index; (3) Orders 
index; and (4) Criminal index. Source: La Porta et al. (2005). 
 
Orders The index of orders equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Orders issuer (An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed at the Issuer 
in case of a defective prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-index of orders to stop 
equals one if the Issuer may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of actions; equals one-half if the Issuer may only be ordered to desist from 
limited actions; equals zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to do equals one if the Issuer may be ordered to perform a broad range of 
actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Issuer may only be ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. We 
disregard orders that may be issued by Courts at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit.); (2) Orders distributor (An index aggregating 
stop and do orders that may be directed at the Distributor in case of a defective prospectus.  The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes 
of orders to stop and to do. The sub-index of orders to stop equals one if the Distributor may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of 
actions; equals one-half if the Distributor may only be ordered to desist from limited actions; equals zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to 
do equals one if the Distributor may be ordered to perform a broad range of actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Distributor 
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may only be ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero otherwise. We disregard orders that may be issued by Courts at the request of a 
private party in a civil lawsuit.); and (3) Orders accountant (An index aggregating stop and do orders that may be directed at the Accountant in 
case of a defective prospectus. The index is formed by averaging the sub-indexes of orders to stop and to do. The sub-index of orders to stop 
equals one if the Accountant may be ordered to refrain from a broad range of actions; equals one-half if the Accountant may only be ordered to 
desist from limited actions; equals zero otherwise. The sub-index of orders to do equals one if the Accountant may be ordered to perform a 
broad range of actions to rectify the violation; equals one-half if the Accountant may only be ordered to perform limited actions; equals zero 
otherwise. We disregard orders that may be issued by Courts at the request of a private party in a civil lawsuit.). Source: La Porta et al. (2005). 
 
Access to equity 
 
Index of the extent to which business executives in a country agree with the statement “Stock markets are open to new firms and medium-sized 
firms.” Scale from 1 (strongly disagree) though 7 (strongly agree). Source: Schwab et al. (1999). 
 
CIFAR CIFAR index represents across-country disclosure environment. We use this CIFAR index to control for the effect of accounting system and 
financial reporting in a country on the decision of adopting IFRS. Source: Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) 
1995.  
 
LogGNP Logarithmic of per capita Gross National Product (in US dollars) in 1996. Source: 1996 World Development Report. 
 
Market capitalization/GDP 
 
Average of the ratio of stock market capitalization held by small shareholders to gross domestic product for the period 1996-2000. The stock 
market capitalization held by small shareholders is computed as the product of the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average 
percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a 
given country. A firm is considered privately-owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
It presents the variables IFRS2004, IFRS2005, Early/late, Disclosurerq, Antidir, Public_enforcement, Orders, Access, CIFAR, LogGNP, and Mktcap as well as their means 
for 38 countries. Table 1 defines the variables.   
 
Country      IFRS2004 IFRS2005 Early/late Disclosurerq Antidir Public_ enforcement Orders Access CIFAR LogGNP Mktcap
Argentina      0 0 2 0.50 4 0.58 0.08 3.23 68.00 12.40 0.13
Australia  0 1 1 0.75 4 0.90 1.00 6.00 80.00 12.64 0.63 
Austria      
       
      
   
       
       
      
       
          
   
      
    
    
    
       
      
       
        
       
        
    
       
        
1 1 0 0.25 2 0.17 0.00 4.89 62.00 12.13 0.07
Belgium 1 1 0 0.42 0 0.15 0.00 5.70 68.00 12.29 0.33
Brazil  0 0 2 0.25 3 0.58 0.75 4.05 56.00 13.03 0.13 
Canada 0 0 2 0.92 4 0.80 1.00 6.39 75.00 13.26 0.61
Chile 0 0 2 0.58 3 0.60 0.42 4.80 78.00 10.69 0.50
Colombia 0 0 2 0.42 1 0.58 0.33 2.78 58.00 10.82 0.04
Denmark 1 1 0 0.58 3 0.37 0.33 5.87 75.00 11.84 0.31
Finland  1 1 0 0.50 2 0.32 0.17 6.37 83.00 11.49 0.93 
France 0 1 1 0.75 2 0.77 1.00 5.75 78.00 14.07 0.49
Germany 1 1 0 0.42 1 0.22 0.00 5.93 67.00 14.46 0.26
Greece 1 1 0 0.33 1 0.32 0.17 5.28 61.00 11.25 0.25
Hong Kong 1 1 0 0.92 4 0.87 1.00 5.50 73.00 11.56 1.39 
India 0 0 2 0.92 2 0.67 0.67 5.30 61.00 12.50 0.19
Ireland 0 1 1 0.67 3 0.37 0.00 5.29 81.00 10.73 0.42
Israel 0 0 2 0.67 3 0.63 1.00 5.35 74.00 11.19 0.24
Italy  0 1 1 0.67 0 0.48 0.00 4.41 66.00 13.94 0.19 
Japan 0 0 2 0.75 3 0.00 0.00 4.92 71.00 15.18 0.59
Korea 0 0 2 0.75 2 0.25 0.08 5.02 68.00 12.73 0.32
Malaysia 0 0 2 0.92 3 0.77 1.00 5.11 79.00 11.00 0.78
Mexico 0 0 2 0.58 0 0.35 0.00 3.90 71.00 12.69 0.11
Netherlands  1 1 0 0.50 2 0.47 0.00 6.43 74.00 12.68 0.88 
New Zealand 0 0 2 0.67 4 0.33 0.00 5.82 80.00 10.69 0.25 
Norway 0 1 1 0.58 3 0.32 0.33 5.57 75.00 11.62 0.25
Philippines 0 0 2 0.83 4 0.83 1.00 4.62 64.00 10.44 0.28
Portugal 0 1 1 0.42 2 0.58 0.25 4.50 56.00 11.41 0.22
Singapore 0 0 2 1.00 3 0.87 1.00 5.50 79.00 11.68 0.80
South Africa 1 1 0 0.83 4 0.25 0.00 5.94 79.00 10.92 0.78 
Spain 0 1 1 0.50 2 0.33 0.00 5.09 72.00 13.19 0.32
Sweden 0 1 1 0.58 2 0.50 0.67 6.15 83.00 12.28 0.90
Switzerland 1 1 0 0.67 1 0.33 0.00 6.07 80.00 12.44 1.44
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Taiwan      
       
      
        
0 0 2 0.75 3 0.52 0.17 5.54 58.00 12.34 0.83
Thailand 0 0 2 0.92 3 0.72 0.33 4.24 66.00 11.72 0.18
Turkey 1 1 0 0.50 2 0.63 0.00 5.03 58.00 12.08 0.13
United Kingdom 0 1 1 0.83 4 0.68 1.00 6.26 85.00 13.86 1.20 
United States 0 0 2 1.00 5 0.90 1.00 6.74 76.00 15.67 1.18 
Zimbabwe 1 1 0 0.50 3 0.42 0.08 4.93 72.00 8.63 0.15
Sample mean 0.32 0.55 1.13 0.65 2.55 0.51 0.39 5.27 71.32 12.20 0.49 
 
Among our sample of 38 countries, 12 (21) countries voluntarily adopted IFRS by the end of 2004 (2005).  
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Table 3 
Univariate correlations (Pearson and Spearman correlations) 
 
  
IFRS2004 
 
IFRS2005 
 
Disclosurerq 
 
Antidir 
 
Public_ 
enforcement 
 
Orders 
 
Access 
 
CIFAR 
 
Mktcap 
 
LogGNP 
IFRS2004  0.611 
(<0.0001) 
−0.393 
(0.015) 
−0.274 
(0.096) 
−0.429 
(0.007) 
−0.415 
(0.010) 
0. 292 
(0.076) 
−0.031 
(0.853) 
0.096 
(0.568) 
−0.150 
(0.370) 
IFRS2005 0.611 
(<0.0001) 
 −0.384 
(0.017) 
−0.304 
(0.064) 
−0.326 
(0.046) 
−0.314 
(0.055) 
0. 362 
(0.026) 
0.208 
(0.210) 
0. 184 
(0.270) 
0. 022 
(0.897) 
Disclosurerq −0.378 
(0.019) 
−0.373 
(0.021) 
 0. 559 
(0.0003) 
0. 568 
(0.0002) 
0. 509 
(0.001) 
0. 286 
(0.082) 
0.390 
(0.015) 
0. 502 
(0.001) 
0. 101 
(0.545) 
Antidir −0.259 
(0.116) 
−0.284 
(0.083) 
0. 519 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
   
0. 490 
(0.002) 
0. 498 
(0.002) 
0. 216 
(0.192) 
0.351 
(0.031) 
0. 303 
(0.065) 
−0.167 
(0.317) 
Public_enforcement −0.394 
(0.014) 
−0.294 
(0.073) 
0. 556 
(0.0003) 
0. 480 
(0.002) 
0. 806 
(<0.0001) 
0. 032 
(0.851) 
0.088 
(0.600) 
0. 172 
(0.302) 
−0.014 
(0.935) 
Orders −0.403 
(0.012) 
−0.282 
(0.086) 
0. 557 
(0.0003) 
0. 513 
(0.001) 
0. 828 
(<0.0001) 
0. 159 
(0.339) 
0.191 
(0.252) 
0. 270 
(0.100) 
−0.051 
(0.759) 
Access 0.307 
(0.060) 
0.384 
(0.017) 
0. 323 
(0.048) 
0. 251 
(0.128) 
0. 023 
(0.893) 
0. 220 
(0.185) 
 0.652 
(<0.0001) 
0. 754 
(<0.0001) 
0. 227 
(0.171) 
CIFAR −0.026 
(0.877) 
0. 195 
(0.242) 
0. 415 
(0.009) 
0. 328 
(0.045) 
0. 068 
(0.683) 
0. 248 
(0.134) 
0. 602 
(<0.0001) 
0. 678 
(<0.0001) 
−0.067 
(0.687) 
Mktcap 0.152 0.168 
(0.364) (0.312) 
0.500 
(0.001) 
0.321 
(0.050) 
0.255 
(0.123) 
0.344 
(0.034) 
0.649 
(<0.0001) 
0.593 
(<0.0001) 
0.160
(0.337) 
LogGNP −0.191 
(0.252) 
−0.025 
(0.880) 
0. 150 
(0.368) 
−0.075 
(0.656) 
−0.015 
(0.929) 
0. 095 
(0.572) 
0. 249 
(0.132) 
0.007 
(0.965) 
0. 233 
(0.159) 
 
 
See Table 1 for explanations of variables. The lower left half of the matrix contains Pearson correlations and the upper right half of the matrix contains Spearman 
correlations. The Pearson and Spearman correlations in bold are significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed) or better. N = 38. 
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Table 4 
Results of OLS regressions on adoption of IFRS by December 2004-Various Regression Specifications  
Dependent variable: IFRS2004  
 
  
Pred. 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
 
Model 10 
Disclosurerq 
 
− 
 
−1.322 
(−3.49)***         
−0.840 
(−2.30)** 
−0.842 
(−2.13)**
Antidir 
 
− 
        
       
           
     
 
−0.141 
(−2.24)**
−0.145 
(−2.59)** 
−0.074 
(−1.29) 
−0.078 
(−1.33) 
Public_enforcement 
 
− 
 
−1.033 
(−3.53)*** 
−0.563 
(−1.82)* 
−0.735 
(−2.41)** 
Orders 
 
− −0.566 
(−3.31)***
−0.375 
(−2.32)**
−0.450 
(−2.65)**
Access 
 
+ 0.317 
(2.78)*** 
0.289 
(3.14)*** 
0.265 
(2.78)*** 
0.324 
(3.08)*** 
0.311 
(3.22)*** 
0.280 
(2.80)*** 
CIFAR 
 
− 
 
−0.007 
(−0.67) 
−0.009 
(−0.84) 
−0.017 
(−1.74)* 
−0.011 
(−1.10) 
−0.025 
(−2.23)** 
−0.019 
(−2.02)* 
−0.022 
(−2.21)** 
−0.022 
(−2.04)** 
−0.021 
(−2.20)** 
−0.025 
(−2.48)** 
Mktcap 
 
+ 
 
0.693 
(2.95)*** 
0.542 
(2.19)** 
0.663 
(2.87)*** 
0.614 
(2.64)** 
0.145 
(0.57) 
0.456 
(2.09)** 
0.484 
(2.13)** 
0.252 
(1.05) 
0.353 
(1.58) 
0.405 
(1.74)* 
LogGNP 
 
− 
 
−0.080 
(−1.60) 
−0.109 
(−1.99)* 
−0.109 
(−2.20)** 
−0.088 
(−1.74)* 
−0.123 
(−2.30)** 
−0.109 
(−2.54)** 
−0.119 
(−2.67)** 
−0.141 
(−2.82)*** 
−0.128 
(−2.78)*** 
−0.141 
(−3.03)*** 
Intercept 
 
 2.286 
(2.41)** 
 
2.393 
(2.31)** 
3.092 
(3.15)*** 
2.094 
(2.18)** 
1.874 
(1.87)* 
1.934 
(2.40)** 
2.508 
(2.87)*** 
2.106 
(2.26)** 
1.948 
(2.28)** 
2.699 
(2.99)*** 
 
Adj. R-square (%) 27.20 
 
13.53 
 
27.66 
 
25.18 
 
19.29 
 
47.94 
 
44.83 
 
31.17 
 
42.11 
 
40.19 
 
T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White (1980). N = 38. 
*** Significant at the one percent level; ** Significant at the five percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Test 
Results of OLS regressions on adoption of IFRS by December 2005-Various Regression Specifications  
Dependent variable: IFRS2005  
 
  
Pred. 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
 
Model 10 
Disclosurerq 
 
− 
 
−1.609 
(−3.96)***         
−1.341 
(−3.09)*** 
−1.519 
(−3.28)***
Antidir 
 
− 
  
−0.173 
(−2.54)**      
       
           
    
 
−0.177 
(−2.81)*** 
−0.133 
(−1.90)* 
−0.150 
(−2.09)** 
Public_enforcement 
 
− 
 
−0.773 
(−2.17)** 
−0.014 
(−0.04) 
−0.301 
(−0.81) 
Orders 
 
− −0.474 
(−2.34)**
−0.178 
(−0.93)
−0.278 
(−1.35)
Access 
 
+ 
 
0.297 
(2.27)** 
0.261 
(2.40)** 
0.260 
(2.33)** 
0.305 
(2.57)** 
0.297 
(2.53)** 
0.287 
(2.35)** 
CIFAR 
 
− 
 
0.016 
(1.49) 
0.013 
(1.09) 
0.005 
(0.41) 
0.010 
(0.83) 
−0.003 
(−0.25) 
0.005 
(0.49) 
0.005 
(0.48) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.002 
(0.13) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
Mktcap 
 
+ 
 
0.447 
(1.78)* 
0.265 
(0.98) 
0.303 
(1.08) 
0.281 
(1.02) 
−0.137 
(−0.47) 
0.215 
(0.83) 
0.196 
(0.74) 
−0.008 
(−0.03) 
0.054 
(0.20) 
0.055 
(0.19) 
LogGNP 
 
− 
 
−0.003 
(−0.06) 
−0.038 
(−0.65) 
−0.031 
(−0.51) 
−0.014 
(−0.24) 
−0.047 
(−0.77) 
−0.030 
(−0.58) 
−0.030 
(−0.56) 
−0.069 
(−1.22) 
−0.061 
(−1.08) 
−0.069 
(−1.21) 
Intercept 
 
 0.269 
(0.27) 
 
0.405 
(0.36) 
0.820 
(0.69) 
0.065 
(0.06) 
−0.141 
(−0.12) 
−0.012 
(−0.01) 
0.043 
(0.04) 
0.137 
(0.13) 
0.039 
(0.04) 
0.381 
(0.35) 
 
Adj. R-square (%) 27.41 
 
10.35 
 
6.26 
 
8.09 
 
7.35 
 
36.24 
 
34.40 
 
23.34 
 
25.25 
 
22.52 
 
T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White (1980). N = 38.  
*** Significant at the one percent level; ** Significant at the five percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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